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Negotiation and Cooperative Action  
for Efficient Water Allocation 
―Analysis by Applying 2x2 Game Theory－ 
 
Kenji YOSHINAGA* 
 
 
Abstract: The paper analyzes the water management in the irrigation system focusing on how to 
achieve a cooperative action among the streams for an efficient water allocation. The analysis is made 
by applying different types of 2x2 Game Theory. It identifies the conflict and its solution in the 
different situations of water management set for the analysis. The situation presented by Prisoner’s 
dilemma game is difficult to take a cooperative action if an incentive measure is not given. This is in 
contrast to other situations of water management discussed by different types of 2x2 Game Theory 
such as Chicken game, Battle of the sex game, Assurance game and Coordination game in which a 
cooperative action could be achieved. The result would lead the up and mid-streams to take the 
cooperative water management action for a fair water allocation to the down-stream.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The paper discusses on how could achieve the efficient water management for a fair 
water allocation in the irrigation system. There exists a large-scale irrigation system in 
countries including Japan belong to Asian monsoon area where agricultural activities, 
mainly rice production, have been prevailing. Not surprisingly, the water supply is 
prerequisite for a crop production for which the irrigation system plays a central 
function and role. The irrigation system is consisted of the up-stream, the mid-stream 
(hereafter, the up and mid-streams) and the down-stream in each stream, in which 
farmers as a beneficiary are required to implement an efficient water management. 
 
The efficient water management in the irrigation system will contribute to increase a 
social benefit in the basin. It includes, for example, an increase of farmer’s income  
――――――――――――――――― 
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with an increment of a crop production, an avoidance of conflict around the water 
allocation among the streams, and then, the water allocation for the environment in the 
basin, these positive effects of which are substantial. Water user’s association in the 
irrigation system has been heavily involved in securing such positive effects by 
arranging rules of the water management by which could regulate the water 
management action taken by farmers. 
 
In some cases, however, an actual situation of the water management in the irrigation 
system is not necessarily efficient because of asymmetric information on water 
management actions taken by the up and mid-streams and the down-stream. In 
particular, farmers of the up and mid-streams are easy to access to the irrigation water, 
then they could allocate their labors and times for the opportunity cost1) which often 
causes the insufficient water allocation to the down-stream. This is one of reasons 
behind the conflict around the water allocation among the streams. It needs an 
agreement on the cooperative action for both streams to implement the efficient water 
management to solve the conflict around the water allocation with a help of water user’s 
association. 
 
With these backgrounds, the paper analyzes on the water management action among 
the up and mid-streams and the down-stream in the irrigation system by applying 2x2 
Game Theory. Upon conducting the analysis, various situations of water management 
are set as the 2x2 game model, based on which discusses the process of negotiation 
toward the cooperative action to achieve an optimal solution. To this end, here adopts 
typical types of 2x2 Game Theory such as Prisoner’s dilemma game, Chicken game, 
Battle of the sex game, Assurance game and Coordination game. 
 
There are many available references and technical books related to 2x2 Game Theory. 
In this paper, it mainly refers to those such as Okada（1996）, Muto (2001), Namatame
（2001）, Schelling（1980）, Olson (1971), Osborne (2009), Taylor (1987), Brams (1990), 
and then, Yoshinaga（2009, 2012, 2013, 2014）as the reference for water management 
and water allocation in the irrigation system. 
 
The paper is consisted of the following 6 Chapters including the introduction. In the 
Chapter 2, it sets the 6 Cases based on different water management situations in the up 
and mid-streams to which different types of 2x2 Game Theory could be applied. These 
Cases are a basis for the analysis of the cooperative water management action in the 
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following Chapters. The Chapter 3 analyzes on the water management action taken by 
both streams in each Case of the water management situation by applying 2x2 Game 
Theory. The analysis pays an attention to how both streams could possibly achieve the 
cooperative water management action. Then, in the Chapter 4, it discusses on the 
conflict and the cooperative action around the water management in the up and 
mid-streams by applying Prisoner’s dilemma game. It analyzes the possible action to be 
taken for the cooperative water management by further applying a sort of repeated 
game. In the Chapter 5, two scenarios of which the up and mid-streams would either 
implement the water management or not are set for the application of 2x2 Game Theory. 
It includes the analysis about institutional arrangements such as a compensation and 
penalty for achieving the cooperative water management. Finally, the Chapter 6 leads 
to the conclusion by summing up the content of each Chapter. 
 
 
2. Water Management Situations for the Application of 2x2 Game Theory 
 
2-1  Water management action and Case setting 
  A large-scale irrigation system covers a huge beneficiary area and supplies a much 
quantity of irrigation water for a crop production For example, UPRIIS (Upper 
Pantabangan River Integrated Irrigation System)2) in Philippines has the beneficiary 
area of more than 100 thousand hectares with the irrigation canal of tens of thousands 
km. In the irrigation system, the efficient water management by farmers is dispensable 
in a fair water allocation for a cop production and the environment preservation in the 
basin. In such large-scale irrigation system, the basin could be divided in the up-stream, 
the mid-stream (that is, the up and mid-streams) 3) and the down-stream. A simplified 
basin model of water management action in the up and mid-streams and the 
down-stream is shown in Fig.-1. 
 
  First of all, let consider the water allocation by the water management action of 
farmers in the up and mid-streams and the down-stream. It assumes the following 
situations with a particular attention to the effect on a crop production and the 
environment in the basin. If both of the up and mid-streams neglect the water 
management, it causes a negative effect on a crop production and the environment in 
the down-stream. If either of the up and mid-streams implements the water 
management, there is no effect on a crop production but does on the environment in the 
basin. And, if both streams do the water management, none of the effect is for the  
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down-stream. It is noted, however, that a degree of effect depends on a scale of available 
water in the irrigation system. It supposes further that farmers in the down-stream 
always implement the efficient water management. 
 
  Given the above, Table-1 shows the combination of efficient ( E ) and inefficient ( IE ) 
water management action taken by the up and mid-streams and its effect on the water 
allocation, namely those on a crop production and the environment in the down-stream. 
Then, the four categorized situations of the water management action taken by the up  
 
 
 Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4
WMA in the up-stream E  E  IE  IE  
WMA in the mid-stream E  IE  E  IE  
Water allocation to the down-stream （+） （±） （±） （－） 
WMA in down-stream E  E  E  E  
Effect on a crop production None None None Effect 
Effect on the environment in the basin None Effect Effect Effect 
Situation A  B  B  C  
 
 
Types of 2x2 Game Theory Coordination, 
Assurance 
Chicken,  
Battle of the sex  
Prisoner’s
dilemma 
（Note）1． E : the efficient water management, IE : the inefficient water management. 
 2．（+）: sufficient,（－）: insufficient, （±）: effect (insufficient) on the environment in the basin.
Table-1：Category of water management action (WMA) 
Up and mid-streams 
Inefficient water management 
Mid-stream
Up-stream 
Down-stream Water shortage area 
Drainage 
In case of the inefficient water 
management by the up and 
mid-streams, water is insufficient 
in the down-stream. 
Intake 
Fig. -1：Basin model for water management 
Canal 
River 
    Up     Mid   Down 
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and mid-streams shown in Table -1 are set as follows. 
 
Firstly, in the category 1, both streams recognize the necessity of water management 
and there is no effect on and no conflict around the water allocation with the 
down-stream, that is, the situation A . In both of categories 2 and 3, either of streams 
neglects the water management and then concerns with the opportunity cost, under 
which it effects negatively on the environment in the basin. This situation allows either 
of streams to be a free-rider on other’s water management which causes a conflict 
around the water allocation with the down-stream, that is, the situation B . And, in the 
category 4, both streams neglect the water management and cause an effect on the 
water allocation in the down-stream. Its degree of the effect is serious when available 
water is limited, but milder when available water is sufficient, that is, the situationC .  
 
2-2  Case setting for the application of 2x2 Game Theory 
Here discusses the water management situation in detail according to the categories 
of the water management action taken by the up-stream  U and the mid-stream  M , 
then tries to set the 6 Cases for the application of 2x2 Game Theory. The payoff is 
allocated with the ordinal order of 1012  . It is also noted that the above 
category is a basis for the discussion on cooperative water management action in the 
following Chapters. 
 
To begin with, it sets Reference game which shows the situation of water 
management usually observed in both streams. Then, Coordination game and 
Assurance game could be applied for the situation A , Chicken game and Battle of the 
sex game for the situation B , and Prisoner’s dilemma game for the situation C to 
analyze the water management action by both streams in each situation. Given this, the 
below sets the 6 Cases for the analysis in each category with the application of 2x2 
Game Theory.  
 
Case 1: Reference game 
A conflict around a fair water allocation among the up and mid-streams and the 
down-stream has often occurred in the irrigation system. In particular, the effect is 
serious for the down-stream if the up and mid-streams neglect the efficient water 
management at the time of water shortage. In addition, there exists asymmetric 
information between both streams if beneficiary area and a number of farmers is large 
in its scale, under which even the water user’s association sometimes faces with a  
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down-stream. It is noted, however, that a degree of effect depends on a scale of available 
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Up-stream 
Down-stream Water shortage area 
Drainage 
In case of the inefficient water 
management by the up and 
mid-streams, water is insufficient 
in the down-stream. 
Intake 
Fig. -1：Basin model for water management 
Canal 
River 
    Up     Mid   Down 
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U       M  E  IE  
E   1,1    2,1  
IE   1,2    1,1  
 
 
difficulty to capture a reason behind the conflict. In these situations, it is possible for 
the up and mid-streams to take the selfish action to maximize own benefit. In other 
words, farmers in the up and mid-streams do not have a motive to implement the 
efficient water management if they could secure sufficient water for a crop production 
and get income as usual even without doing the water management. As a result, this 
causes a negative effect on the water allocation to the down-stream.  
 
Such performance by farmers in the up and mid-streams is often observed when they 
are indifference to a necessity of water management. This will continue until an 
effective incentive is put in place for implementing an efficient water management. 
Fig.-2 shows the payoff matrix with the application of 2x2 Game Theory to the relation 
between the up and mid-streams. The Case 1 is set as “Reference game”. 
 
Case 2: Choice of the inefficient water management 
  Here, let suppose the case where if either of the up and mid-streams does water 
management, a negative effect on the water allocation to the down-stream is limited. In 
this case, both streams intend to be a free-rider on the water management made by the 
opponent. Both streams notice that it is possible to increase their incomes by 
appropriating labor and time for alternative jobs. At the same time, they recognize the 
necessity of water management and possible conflict with the down-stream who suffers 
from water shortage if they neglect water management. Against this, both streams 
must decide by themselves whether they would do the water management or not due to 
a lack of information on an action taken by the other stream.   
 
Given this situation, both streams prefer to the inefficient water management on the 
assumption that the opponent would does the water management. This is because both 
streams know an alternative possible income if they pursue the opportunity cost 
without implementing the water management. It needs a binding rule of the water 
management in order to enforce the up and mid-streams to do water management for 
better water allocation to the down-stream. Fig.-3 shows the payoff matrix with the 
application of 2x2 Game Theory to the relation between the up and mid-streams. The  
Fig.- 2：Case 1- Reference game 
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U      M  E  IE  
E   1,1   2,0  
IE   0,2   1,1   
  
 
Case 2 is categorized in “Chicken game”. 
 
Case 3 : Integrated water management by the up and mid-streams 
  As an extension of Case 2, let suppose the case where the mid-stream could judge own  
water management action after confirming the action taken by the up-stream under the 
condition that both streams do water management4). On the other hand, the up-stream 
could decide not to do water management in prior to an action taken by the mid-stream. 
Predominance of a time lag in the decision made by both streams causes a difference of 
benefit. This is only effective for the case in which both streams choose the same action, 
namely, of implementing the water management or not. While, in the case where both 
streams take the different action, each stream decides by own judgement without 
taking into account the opponent’s action, in which there is no benefit by a time lag. 
 
In this case, it supposes the situation where there is sufficient available water for the 
down-stream and if the up-stream does or does not the efficient water management, the 
mid-stream would follow it. And, both streams could get a benefit only if they take the 
same action. This is equivalent to the same as the action taken by both streams as an 
integrated stream5). Fig.-4 shows the payoff matrix with the application of 2x2 Game 
Theory to the relation between the up and mid-streams. The Case 3 is categorized in 
“Battle of the sex game”. 
 
U       M  E  IE  
E   2,1   0,0  
IE   0,0   1,2  
 
 
Case 4 : Efficient vs. inefficient water management 
  The up and mid-streams located geographically in the irrigation system could enjoy 
an easy access to water. In particular, when available water is sufficient, both streams 
would encounter the decision on whether they should choose to do the efficient water 
management or not for an alternative opportunity cost. It is fair to say that the efficient  
Fig.-3: Case 2 - Chicken game 
Fig.-4: Case 3 - Battle of the sex game 
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difficulty to capture a reason behind the conflict. In these situations, it is possible for 
the up and mid-streams to take the selfish action to maximize own benefit. In other 
words, farmers in the up and mid-streams do not have a motive to implement the 
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Such performance by farmers in the up and mid-streams is often observed when they 
are indifference to a necessity of water management. This will continue until an 
effective incentive is put in place for implementing an efficient water management. 
Fig.-2 shows the payoff matrix with the application of 2x2 Game Theory to the relation 
between the up and mid-streams. The Case 1 is set as “Reference game”. 
 
Case 2: Choice of the inefficient water management 
  Here, let suppose the case where if either of the up and mid-streams does water 
management, a negative effect on the water allocation to the down-stream is limited. In 
this case, both streams intend to be a free-rider on the water management made by the 
opponent. Both streams notice that it is possible to increase their incomes by 
appropriating labor and time for alternative jobs. At the same time, they recognize the 
necessity of water management and possible conflict with the down-stream who suffers 
from water shortage if they neglect water management. Against this, both streams 
must decide by themselves whether they would do the water management or not due to 
a lack of information on an action taken by the other stream.   
 
Given this situation, both streams prefer to the inefficient water management on the 
assumption that the opponent would does the water management. This is because both 
streams know an alternative possible income if they pursue the opportunity cost 
without implementing the water management. It needs a binding rule of the water 
management in order to enforce the up and mid-streams to do water management for 
better water allocation to the down-stream. Fig.-3 shows the payoff matrix with the 
application of 2x2 Game Theory to the relation between the up and mid-streams. The  
Fig.- 2：Case 1- Reference game 
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U       M  E  IE  
E   2,2   0,1  
IE   1,0    1,1  
 
 
water management would be effective for a crop production and the environment in the 
basin through an equal water allocation to the down-stream. Both streams, however, 
are in a position to gain an alternative income by seeking the opportunity cost and if it 
exceeds a benefit obtained by implementing the water management, they would prefer 
to neglect it. Further, it is noted that there is no merit for both streams if not 
considering the water allocation to the down-stream in the case where either of the 
streams does the water management while the other prefers to be a free-rider. 
 
It is a better choice for both streams to implement the water management in a 
cooperative way which is effective for the operation and management in the irrigation 
system as a whole. For that, it is prerequisite that farmers in both streams recognize a 
necessity of the water management and rule of a fair water allocation to the 
down-stream. Against this, either of the streams has no intention to do unilaterally the 
water management if the utility of alternative income is higher. Fig.-5 shows the payoff 
matrix with the application of 2x2 Game Theory to the relation between the up and 
mid-streams. The Case 4 is categorized in “Assurance game”. 
 
Case 5 : Best choice of the cooperative water management 
Then, let suppose the situation where the up and mid-streams recognize an 
importance of the water management and does a fair water allocation to the 
down-stream. This is the case for both streams to tackle efficiently with the water 
management by which could be expected of achieving the efficient water allocation. 
Both streams could concentrate in the water management without any concern in the 
opportunity cost. Moreover, there is no conflict with the down-stream and the 
cooperative action would be taken through a negotiation among the streams, if any 
conflict.  
 
U       M  E  IE  
E   2,2   0,1  
IE   1,0   1,1   
 
Fig.-5 : Case 4 - Assurance game 
Fig.- 6 : Case 5 - Coordination game
YOSHINAGA：Negotiation and Cooperative Action for Efficient Water Allocation
―Analysis by Applying 2x2 Game Theory―
135
9 
 
Both streams could gain the maximum benefit by choosing the cooperative action. 
This means that the benefit would be reduced if either of the streams neglects the water 
management, and a whole irrigation system will lose the benefit from both of a crop 
production and the environment preservation if both streams neglect the water 
management. In other words, this loss would work as an incentive for choosing the 
efficient water management action. Fig.-6 shows the payoff matrix with the application 
of 2x2 Game Theory to the relation between the up and mid-streams. The Case 5 is 
categorized in “Coordination game”. 
 
Case 6 : Personal benefit rather than the water management 
The situation of water management action taken by the up and mid-streams in this 
case is similar to Reference game except the payoff allocation. That is to say, both 
streams put a high priority on own benefit by pursuing an alternative opportunity cost 
without implementing the water management. This means that both streams do not 
reorganize a social benefit otherwise obtained if they take the cooperative action. In 
other words, both streams lose a social benefit by pursuing a personal benefit without 
doing the water management. Fig.-7 shows the payoff matrix with the application of 2x2 
Game Theory to the relation between the up and mid-streams. The Case 6 is categorized 
in “Prisoner’s dilemma game”. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
3．Analysis on the Water Management Action by Applying 2x2 Game Theory 
 
Followed by the above 6 Cases set for the water management situation, it proceeds to 
analyze the action of both streams in each case by applying 2x2 Game Theory. In the 
analysis, a particular attention is paid to how to achieve the cooperative action through 
a negotiation by both streams in each Case. Here initiates the analysis on Reference 
game in the Case 1 and Prisoner’s dilemma game in the Case 6 in which there are 
common or contrary factors. In addition, the payoff comparison of other 4 Cases is 
shown in Fig.-8 which is referred in the following 2x2 game analyses. 
 
U       M  E  IE  
E   1,1   2,1  
IE   1,2    0,0  
Fig.-7 : Case 6 - Prisoner’s dilemma game 
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U       M  E  IE  
E   2,2   0,1  
IE   1,0    1,1  
 
 
water management would be effective for a crop production and the environment in the 
basin through an equal water allocation to the down-stream. Both streams, however, 
are in a position to gain an alternative income by seeking the opportunity cost and if it 
exceeds a benefit obtained by implementing the water management, they would prefer 
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U       M  E  IE  
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Case 1 : Reference game 
As shown in Fig.-2, Reference game presents the action that the up and mid-streams 
try to maximize the personal benefit, and its equilibrium solution is  IEIE,  and payoff 
is  1,1 , then it is Pareto optimal. In this case, both streams do not take unilaterally 
the efficient water management action ( E ) because they have not any incentive to do so. 
This requires an incentive from the outside such measures as a compensation for the 
efficient water management action and a penalty to the inefficient action but which 
should be more than the opportunity cost. Even at an actual field level, once both 
streams fall in this Case, they would neglect the efficient water management. Against 
the Case 1, what is the most necessary is to enhance farmer’s awareness on an 
importance of water management through the training planned by water user’s 
association6). By doing so, both streams must make an effort to move to the cooperative 
solution  EE,  from the equilibrium solution  IEIE,  which means a change of value 
system for farmers in both streams.   
 
Case 6 : Prisoner’s dilemma game 
In the next place, it discusses Prisoner’s dilemma game in relation to Reference game. 
A rational choice for the up and mid-streams is also inefficient water management 
action ( IE ), then the equilibrium solution is  IEIE,  and payoff is  0,0 , but not the 
Pareto equilibrium solution. The Pareto equilibrium is  EE,  that is the case for both 
streams to take the cooperative action. In Prisoner’s dilemma game, it loses a social 
benefit by pursuing personal benefit. In order to move to the cooperative action, it needs  
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for both streams to repeat the water management action, that is, a repeated game, in 
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mid-stream (M ) and the latter for the up-stream (U ) which are the optimal solution for  
Case    Line 2x2 game 
1 Reference game 
   6 Prisoner’s dilemma game 
0 
1 
2 
1 2
UU
MU
Fig.-9: Payoff comparison of Case1 and Case 6 
－1 －2 
－1 
－2 
Case 6
Case 1 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 1 : Reference game 
As shown in Fig.-2, Reference game presents the action that the up and mid-streams 
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both streams. However, if taking into account the water allocation to the down-stream, 
these equilibriums are not the optimal action because only either of streams takes the 
efficient water management action. 
 
Now, let suppose that both streams negotiate for a fair water allocation to the 
down-stream. The scope for negotiation is on the line linked between two equilibriums 
of A and B  as shown in Fig.-10. Then, it could reach to the equilibrium point  1,1  
for the agreement if both streams compromise each other on the neutral stance in terms 
of payoff. This results in the changed payoff comparison shown with dotted line in 
Fig.-10. It is also presented in the payoff matrix in Fig.-11 where shows that the 
efficient water management action E  in both streams weakly dominates the 
inefficient action IE  and reach to the equilibrium point for the agreement, that is, the 
optimal solution  EE,  and payoff  1,1 7). This indicates that both streams choose 
the cooperative action by which a social benefit for the basin as a whole is the same as 
the one before the negotiation.  
 
Case 3 : Battle of the sex game 
In Battle of the sex game shown in Fig.-4, the up and mid-streams are asked to choose 
whether they do the efficient ( E ) or inefficient ( IE ) water management under the 
situation where available water is sufficient. Given this, both streams choose two 
equilibriums  EE,  and  IEIE,  that are Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimal. It is, 
however, noted that the payoffs are  2,1  and  1,2 , respectively, and both are  
U     M E  IE  
E   1,1   1,0  
IE   0,1   1,1 
0
1  
2
1 2 UU
MU  
Scope of negotiation 
Fig.-11: Changed payoff matrix Fig.-10: Payoff comparison and scope of negotiation
Equilibrium for agreement 
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B
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asymmetric. Thus, which equilibrium is preferred depends on the negotiation of both 
streams. It is clear for the mid-stream to choose the former while the up-stream does 
the latter, but yet, the former is better choice for a benefit of the basin as a whole8). 
 
As a next step, suppose that both streams negotiate as did in the Case 2. Then, the 
scope for negotiation is on the line linked between two equilibriums of A  and B  as 
shown in Fig.-12. This results in the changed payoff as shown in Fig.-13 in which there 
are two sets of Nash equilibriums of  EE,  and  IEIE,  and both are Pareto optimal 
with the symmetric payoff of  5.1,5.1 . It is noticed that it could reach to the 
equilibrium solution  EE,  in which both streams will agree to take the cooperative 
water management action with a high probability. 
 
Case 4 : Assurance game 
In Assurance game shown in Fig.-5, there are two equilibrium solutions of  EE,  
and  IEIE,  and its payoffs are  2,2  and  1,1 , respectively. It is clear that the 
former equilibrium is the optimal solution and Pareto optimal. If both streams consider 
a social benefit with a high priority without pursuing a personal benefit, they could 
reach to the optimal solution  EE, . To this end, it requires for both streams to keep a 
rule of the water management.   
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both streams. However, if taking into account the water allocation to the down-stream, 
these equilibriums are not the optimal action because only either of streams takes the 
efficient water management action. 
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efficient water management action E  in both streams weakly dominates the 
inefficient action IE  and reach to the equilibrium point for the agreement, that is, the 
optimal solution  EE,  and payoff  1,1 7). This indicates that both streams choose 
the cooperative action by which a social benefit for the basin as a whole is the same as 
the one before the negotiation.  
 
Case 3 : Battle of the sex game 
In Battle of the sex game shown in Fig.-4, the up and mid-streams are asked to choose 
whether they do the efficient ( E ) or inefficient ( IE ) water management under the 
situation where available water is sufficient. Given this, both streams choose two 
equilibriums  EE,  and  IEIE,  that are Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimal. It is, 
however, noted that the payoffs are  2,1  and  1,2 , respectively, and both are  
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equilibrium  IEIE,  which could be obtained by choosing the inefficient action. Now 
sets an income  obtained by the opportunity cost and then, if 1,21   , the 
equilibrium solution moves to  IEIE,  and payoff becomes    1,1  which is the 
optimal solution and Pareto optimal. However, this is not optimal if considering the 
water allocation to the down-stream. On the other hand, suppose the case of penalty if 
both streams neglect the water management, then if 2,11   , the payoff for 
the equilibrium solution  IEIE,  is    1,1  which results in Pareto optimal 
solution of  EE, . 
 
Case 5 : Coordination game 
Refereeing to Coordination game shown in Fig.-8, the slope of the lines linked each 
payoff point is positive by which it settles in the equilibrium solution  EE,  and 
Pareto optimal. This shows that farmers in both streams recognize the effectiveness of 
water management which could bring about a social benefit. In this case, it does not 
need to negotiate for both streams but it is a matter of how to maintain the status quo. 
However, if farmers in both streams concern with the income obtained from the 
opportunity cost and neglect the water management, they will lose the equilibrium, 
thus a social benefit. So as to avoid such risk, it needs to set an institutional 
arrangement for farmers to keep a rule of the water management. For that, it requires 
for water user’s association to play a key role. 
 
At last, it discussed in the above on the water management action taken by the up 
and mid-streams in the 6 Cases by applying 2x2 Game Theory. The result shows, in 
particular, that it is difficult to move to the cooperative action in the cases of Reference 
game and Prisoner’s dilemma game in comparison to the other 4 Cases. This requires 
incentives to make both streams move to the cooperative action which should be a 
binding rule for the water management designed in a democratic way. 
 
 
4.  Conflict and Cooperation around the Water Management  
 
4-1   Water management action and Prisoner’s dilemma game 
  The next is to analyze on the conflict and cooperation around the water management 
action taken by the up and mid-streams. As a presumption for the analysis, here again 
sets the situation where it is possible to allocate water to the down-stream if either of 
the up and mid-streams does the water management but it causes serious water  
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IE   ii zw ,   ii yy ,
 
 
 
 
 
 
shortage to the down-stream if both streams neglect the water management. 
 
  The situation in the above is corresponding to Prisoner’s dilemma game. Fig.-14 
shows the payoff matrix of Prisoner ’s dilemma game with the conditions of 
iiii zyxw   and iii zwx 2 . The former condition shows that a choice of the  
selfish action ( IE ) is advantageous than the cooperative action ( E ) while the latter 
means that both streams could get favorable outcome by taking the cooperative action. 
Against this, both streams choose the selfish action ( IE ) since it strongly dominates the 
cooperative action ( E ), as the outcome of which they are put in the inferior payoff 
position, that is, in the situation of dilemma.  
 
  Then, let apply Prisoner’s dilemma game to analyze the water management taken by 
the up and mid-streams. As mentioned, a socially Pareto optimal situation could not be 
achieved although both streams choose the action to maximize a personal benefit based 
on the rationality. In this case, both streams decide their actions independently without 
sharing information on the water management. As shown in Fig.-14, Nash equilibrium 
is  IEIE,  and payoff is  ii yy ,  which is inferior to a socially Pareto optimal 
equilibrium solution of  EE,  and payoff  ii xx , .  
 
4-2  Move to the cooperative action 
It proceeds to analyze the possibility of a move from the selfish action to the 
cooperative action in Prisoner’s dilemma game. Here sets n  as a number of 
beneficiaries in the up and mid-streams, then p  presents the ratio of n  who chooses 
the efficient water management action ( E ) and p1  for the inefficient water 
management action ( IE ). Given this, the expected payoff for the up-stream who chooses
E  is; 
 
(Note) 1. iiii zyxw  , iii zwx 2 , 2. It means that 
UM is for the row (up and mid-streams) and D is for the 
column (down-stream) 3. E means the efficient water 
management (Cooperation) and IE does the inefficient 
water management (Defeat).  
Fig.-14 : Payoff matrix of Prisoner’s dilemma game 
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when IE  is chosen; 
  
  iiIE nyppnwU  1  ……………….. (2) 
 
then, the difference of (1) and (2) is; 
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Now, if the difference of payoff ii zy   is small and close to 0 9), the 2nd term in (3) 
could approximate to 0 which is presented as follows;  
 
  pnxwUU iiEIE   ……………….. (4) 
 
Further, theoretically, if p  and n  are small, the right side in (4) could be 
approximated with   0 pnxw ii , herewith no difference between payoff iw  for IE  
and ix for E , then the superior in terms of payoff becomes smaller for both streams. 
This means that there is a possibility for farmers in both streams to move from the 
inefficient action to the cooperative action. Given that the ratio of p  and the value of 
n  are smaller, a number of farmers to choose IE  becomes smaller if the difference of 
payoff between the actions of iw  and ix are smaller. On the contrary, if the ratio of p  
and the value of n  are large, then   0 pnxw ii  by which farmers prefer to choose IE  
since the superior in terms of payoff becomes larger. This could increase a number of 
farmers to choose IE . This means that if a number of beneficiaries is smaller, easier to 
achieve the cooperative action and if does larger, the most prefer to choose IE 10). 
 
As a next step, it tries to make a move to the cooperative action. Fig.-7 (reproduced) 
presents the situation around the water management in the up and mid-streams with 
Prisoner’s dilemma game. Let consider both streams that prefer to the selfish action 
move to the cooperative action. The measure for that is for both streams to allocate 
times of own payoff to the opponent. This means that it is a sort of reward if choosing E  
while is a sort of penalty if choosing IE  by which could coordinate the payoff as shown 
in Fig.-15. The changed payoff matrix is shown in Fig.-16 in which the set of water  
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management action  EE,  and payoff  2,2  is Nash equilibrium solution and Pareto 
optimal. By adopting this operation, the type of 2x2 game would changes from 
Prisoner’s dilemma game to Coordination game.  
 
In the same way, it links each set of payoff with the line in Prisoner’s dilemma game, 
the result of which is shown with the rhombus in Fig.-1711). In the Figure, the area for 
Pareto improvement is shown with the shaded part surrounded by the right side of the 
equilibrium solution  0,0  and both vertical and horizontal axes where the Pareto 
optimal solution is in the set of the inefficient water management action  IEIE,  and 
payoff is  1,1 . On the other hand, the payoff matrix of Coordination game that is 
obtained by the above procedure is also shown in Fig.-17. It is presented in the dotted 
line that links the equilibrium solution  0,0  and Nash equilibrium solution  2,2 . 
Then, the equilibrium solution of Prisoner’s dilemma game  1,1  is on this line. It is, 
here, marked the presumption in the above discussion that both streams could access to 
information on the action by the opponent through, for example, experience and rumor 
even though there exists asymmetric information between them. This process is the 
move to the cooperative action under the situation being similar to the repeated game. 
  
  Theoretically, the move to the cooperative action in Prisoner’s dilemma game could be 
achieved in the infinite repeated game. In the repeated game, if one moves from the 
selfish action to the cooperative action and then, the opponent follows the cooperative  
U     M  E  IE  
E     1,1     2,21
IE    21,2   0,0  
U     M  E  IE  
E   2,2   1,1  
IE   1,1   0,0  
Fig.-7：Prisoner’s dilemma game (reproduced)
Fig.-15 : Mutual arrangement of payoff
Fig.-16 : Move to Coordination game
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move to the cooperative action. The measure for that is for both streams to allocate 
times of own payoff to the opponent. This means that it is a sort of reward if choosing E  
while is a sort of penalty if choosing IE  by which could coordinate the payoff as shown 
in Fig.-15. The changed payoff matrix is shown in Fig.-16 in which the set of water  
Journal of Regional Development Studies （2016）144
18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
action, namely call it, “Tit for tat strategy”, the cooperative action will be achieved by 
noticing its payoff being more than that by the selfish action. Usually, the discount rate 
10,   is applied in payoff comparison. In the infinite repeated game, if the discount 
rate  is set to be close to 1, the discounted average payoff in Nash equilibrium  1,1
could be approximated with the equilibrium solution  1,1 . A random set of payoff 
 21, xx  being in the shaded part in Fig.-17 is the equilibrium solution that is Pareto 
improved comparing to Nash equilibrium  0,0 . The discounted average payoff of the 
random set of payoff  21, xx  could be approximated by Nash equilibrium attained in 
the infinite repeated game with the discount rate  being to be close to 1 (Osborne, 
2009)12).    
 
As a different approach, here takes up the nonmyopic equilibria which is a dynamic 
equilibrium concept of more foreseeing the future than Nash equilibrium 
(Brams,1990)13). It assumes that a player, in deciding whether to depart from an 
outcome, thinks over not only an immediate effect of its action but also a long-term 
stable outcome by considering a consequence of the other player’s probable response, 
then its own counter-response, and so on. Through this process in comparing the final 
outcome to the initial outcome, if they are better off at the initial outcome, they will not 
depart from the first place. Then, the initial outcome will be the equilibrium in a 
nonmyopic sense.  
 
  Also, let consider the sequential game with the following rules (Brams,1990); namely, 
Line 2x2 game 
 Prisoner’s dilemma game 
   Coordination game 
1 2－1 －2 
－1 
－2 
 2,2 2,1  
 1,2 
 0,0  
 1,1
Fig.-17：Payoff allocation toward Cooperation 
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(1) Both players simultaneously chooses the strategy, thereby defining the initial 
outcome. (2) At an initial outcome, either player can unilaterally switch its strategy and 
changes that outcome to a sequential outcome. (3) Followed by, other player responds by 
unilaterally switching its strategy, thereby moves to a new outcome. (4) By repeating 
this process, the outcome will reach to the final outcome where the game terminates. 
And, (5) the play will terminate at the node such that the player with the next move can 
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up-stream  U  firstly departs from there, then moves to  1,2   and followed by, the 
mid-stream  M  switches to  0,0  as a counter-response, against which the 
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  Here applies the backward induction to this sequential game, then the up-stream  U
chooses the equilibrium solution  0,0 at the terminal node, followed by the 
mid-stream  M  does the equilibrium solution  0,0  at the second node, and finally,  
at the initial node, the up-stream  U  prefers to stay at the equilibrium solution  1,1  
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U  1,1  
U  0,0  
M  1,2   
Move 
 1,1Stay 
Stay  1,2 
 0,0  
 2,1  
Move Stay 
Move
Fig.-18：Prisoner’s dilemma game as the sequential game 
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action, namely call it, “Tit for tat strategy”, the cooperative action will be achieved by 
noticing its payoff being more than that by the selfish action. Usually, the discount rate 
10,   is applied in payoff comparison. In the infinite repeated game, if the discount 
rate  is set to be close to 1, the discounted average payoff in Nash equilibrium  1,1
could be approximated with the equilibrium solution  1,1 . A random set of payoff 
 21, xx  being in the shaded part in Fig.-17 is the equilibrium solution that is Pareto 
improved comparing to Nash equilibrium  0,0 . The discounted average payoff of the 
random set of payoff  21, xx  could be approximated by Nash equilibrium attained in 
the infinite repeated game with the discount rate  being to be close to 1 (Osborne, 
2009)12).    
 
As a different approach, here takes up the nonmyopic equilibria which is a dynamic 
equilibrium concept of more foreseeing the future than Nash equilibrium 
(Brams,1990)13). It assumes that a player, in deciding whether to depart from an 
outcome, thinks over not only an immediate effect of its action but also a long-term 
stable outcome by considering a consequence of the other player’s probable response, 
then its own counter-response, and so on. Through this process in comparing the final 
outcome to the initial outcome, if they are better off at the initial outcome, they will not 
depart from the first place. Then, the initial outcome will be the equilibrium in a 
nonmyopic sense.  
 
  Also, let consider the sequential game with the following rules (Brams,1990); namely, 
Line 2x2 game 
 Prisoner’s dilemma game 
   Coordination game 
1 2－1 －2 
－1 
－2 
 2,2 2,1  
 1,2 
 0,0  
 1,1
Fig.-17：Payoff allocation toward Cooperation 
UU
MU
 21, xx
2
1 
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Initial outcome Final outcome 
 1,1   1,1 /  1,1  
 1,2    1,2  /  0,0  
 2,1   0,0 /  2,1  
 0,0   0,0 /  0,0  
 
U    M  E  IE  
E   1,1 /  1,1   0,0 /  2,1
IE   1,2  /  0,0  0,0 /  0,0
 
 
U     M  E  IE  
E   1,1   1,5.0  
IE   5.0,1    0,0  
 
 
The above process could be applied to both streams and other combination sets of 
payoff, namely as an initial outcome, by which 2 players (U and M ) with 4 combination 
sets of payoff produce 8 final outcomes. It is shown in Table-2 in which the right-side is 
for the up-stream  U  and the left-side for the mid-stream  M  in the final outcome. 
Then, the final outcome is substituted for the initial outcome in the original payoff 
matrix shown in Fig,-7 which produces a changed payoff matrix shown in Fig.-19. 
 
In Fig.-19, let try to find the equilibrium solution by taking into account the expected 
payoff of U and M in the final outcome. In doing so, the payoff matrix of Fig.-19 could 
be transferred to the new matrix shown in Fig.-20. It results in two equilibrium 
solutions of  EE,  and  IEIE, , and payoffs  1,1  and  0,0 , respectively and the 
former is Pareto optimal. This means that the inefficient water management action in 
Prisoner’s dilemma game could be shifted to the efficient water management if the up 
and mid-streams take a sequential game to seek the best choice. 
 
 
5.  Water Management Action toward Cooperation 
 
In the analysis in this Chapter, it redefines the up and mid-stream as the integrated 
Table-2 : Initial and final outcomes 
Fig.-19：Changed payoff matrix by the final outcome
Fig.-20：Transferred payoff matrix 
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one stream, call it, the integrated up-stream14). Then, it analyzes here the change of the 
payoff in applying 2x2 game for the cases of water management action taken by the 
integrated up-stream(UM ) and the down-stream(D ); the former takes the alternative 
actions of “does” and “does not” the water management, but the latter takes always the 
action of “does”.  Then, the following two scenarios are set for the analysis; 
 
Scenario 1:  the integrated up-stream implements the efficient water management 
so as to contribute to reduce a risk of water shortage in the down-stream. 
Scenario 2: the integrated up-stream does not implement the efficient water 
management and then, seek the opportunity cost. 
 
Prior to the analysis the below, let define the crop production function  Lf  in both 
streams using Cobb-Douglas production function,  LAKY  , where A  is constant, 
K  for the capital input, L  for the labor input.  Here simplifies it taking into account 
only labor input 
2
2LL  for the water management15). Then, it is   







2
2LALf , where
1,1,0   . 
 
5-1  Payoff analysis in Scenario 1 
  The payoff function for the integrated up-stream umU  and the down-stream dU  
could be presented as follows; 
 
  oum CLpLpfU  '   …………………….. (1) 
   LpfLpLpfUd  '2
1
  …………….….. (2) 
 
where  Lpf  for the output, Lp '  for the cost of water management, oC  for the 
opportunity cost,  Lpf  for the output reduction in the case of the inefficient water 
management by the integrated up-stream,   10    is constant, p  for the crop 
price, 'p  for the labor cost used for a crop production, then set 'pp   due to that  Lf  
depends only on the labor input L  and suppose that the labor input in the 
down-stream is 
2
1  as that of the integrated up -stream due to the difference of scale of 
beneficiary area.  
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for the up-stream  U  and the left-side for the mid-stream  M  in the final outcome. 
Then, the final outcome is substituted for the initial outcome in the original payoff 
matrix shown in Fig,-7 which produces a changed payoff matrix shown in Fig.-19. 
 
In Fig.-19, let try to find the equilibrium solution by taking into account the expected 
payoff of U and M in the final outcome. In doing so, the payoff matrix of Fig.-19 could 
be transferred to the new matrix shown in Fig.-20. It results in two equilibrium 
solutions of  EE,  and  IEIE, , and payoffs  1,1  and  0,0 , respectively and the 
former is Pareto optimal. This means that the inefficient water management action in 
Prisoner’s dilemma game could be shifted to the efficient water management if the up 
and mid-streams take a sequential game to seek the best choice. 
 
 
5.  Water Management Action toward Cooperation 
 
In the analysis in this Chapter, it redefines the up and mid-stream as the integrated 
Table-2 : Initial and final outcomes 
Fig.-19：Changed payoff matrix by the final outcome
Fig.-20：Transferred payoff matrix 
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By adding up (1) and (2), a total benefit in the basin is presented as follows: 
 
     
    .
2
32
2
1
o
odumu
CpLLpf
LpfpLLpfCpLLpfUUS




 …………… (3) 
 
Then, try to find the socially first best labor allocation by the first order condition in 
(3), that is; 
 
    pLpf
L
Su
2
32 ' 

   
 
24
3'

Lf ,  10   . 
 
Followed by, it seeks the payoff of each stream by applying the marginal labor in the 
functions of umU  and dU  as shown in (1) and (2). Namely, set   LLf   by   LLf ' , 
where sets 1A , then;  
 
oum CU   
.
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21
4
3
24
3
2
21
2
21
p
p
pLU d








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

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


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



 




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



 
 
And, the equilibrium solution for both streams is; 
 
 














 pCUU odum 

2
21
4
3,, ……………………………………..…. (4) 
 
Since it supposes that the integrated up-stream does the efficient water management 
in Scenario 1, it could set 10,0   in (4) when the water allocation is sufficient to 
the down-stream. Then, the equilibrium solution in this case is; 
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 





 pCUU odum 8
3,,  
 
This means that since farmers in the integrated up-stream implement the efficient 
water management, they do not allocate their labor time to the opportunity cost. That is 
the loss of oC for the integrated up-stream. While, the down-stream could reduce the 
labor cost up to p
8
3 . Owing to the efficient water management by the integrated 
up-stream, the down-stream could reduce the labor cost and if oCp 8
3 , it could improve 
a social welfare of the basin as a whole. In this case, as an incentive for promoting the 
efficient water management by farmers in the integrated up-stream, it is one of possible 
measures for the down-stream to compensate them with an equivalent amount 
otherwise obtained by the opportunity cost. 
 
5-2  Payoff analysis in Scenario 2 
The payoff analysis in Scenario 2 follows to the Scenario 1. Of difference is that the 
integrated up-stream is involved in the opportunity cost oC  without doing the water 
management.  The payoff functions of umU  and dU  is set as follows, where the labor 
cost for the opportunity cost is the same as p and then, the payoff function of the 
down-stream dU is the same as the above. 
 
   LpCLpfU oum '  
   LpfLpLpfUd  '2
1
 
 
Then, by following the same procedure as in Scenario 1, the equilibrium solution for 
both streams is set as; 
 
 














 pCUU odum 

2
21
4
3,, …………………………… (5) 
 
  In Scenario 2, it supposes the case where the integrated up-stream engages in the 
opportunity cost without doing the water management which is a cause for the 
insufficient water allocation to the down-stream, that is,   takes the vale in 10    
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By adding up (1) and (2), a total benefit in the basin is presented as follows: 
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And, the equilibrium solution for both streams is; 
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


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
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






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Since it supposes that the integrated up-stream does the efficient water management 
in Scenario 1, it could set 10,0   in (4) when the water allocation is sufficient to 
the down-stream. Then, the equilibrium solution in this case is; 
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depending on its degree.  As the extreme case, let consider the case in which if the 
down-stream could not produce a crop because the integrated up-stream does not 
implement the water management, then 1  in (5) whereby the equilibrium solution 
is; 
 
 





  pCUU odum 4
3,, . 
 
  This means that the integrated up-stream gets the payoff oC  by the opportunity cost 
but the down-stream suffers the loss of labor cost p
4
3  needed for the water 
management under the insufficient water allocation. Then, if pCo 4
3
 , on the contrary 
to Scenario 1, it is one of possible measures to impose the penalty on the integrated 
up-stream for a compensation to the down-stream. And, as   takes a random value in 
10  , the equilibrium of dU varies depending on  . As shown in Fig.-21, if   is 
close to 1 (or 0), the equilibrium becomes negative (or positive) across the point of 
2
1
 , 
then it settles in pUd 4
3,1   (or pUd 8
3,0  ). 
 
5-3   Compensation and penalty 
By setting the equilibrium solutions obtained in Scenarios 1 and 2 as the payoff of 2x2 
game, it tries to find Nash equilibrium to examine the action to be taken for the 
dU  
p83  
1
p43  
0  21  
1
1
Fig.-21 : Relation of   and dU  
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cooperation. In the same way as the above, it adopts the efficient  E  and inefficient
 IE  water management as the strategy, and then applies the sets of the equilibrium 
solution in the payoff matrix16) as shown in Fig.-22. It is noted that the payoff of the 
down-stream in  IEIE,  is set as 




 
4
3X .   
 
In this game, it leads to Nash equilibrium solution with the set of water management 
action  EIE,  and its payoff 




  pCo 4
3, . This shows that the integrated up-stream 
engages in the opportunity cost without doing the water management while the 
down-stream does, which is a prevailing situation in both streams observed often in the 
irrigation system.  
 
Given this situation, let consider the incentive in order for the integrated up-stream 
to do water management and contribute to the water allocation to the down-stream. If 
oCp 8
3  as mentioned above, the down-stream makes a commitment to compensate an 
equivalent amount to the opportunity cost for their efficient water management. Here 
sets x  for a compensation cost, then the changed payoff matrix is shown in Fig.-23. 
The payoff allocation for both streams in the set of efficient water management action
 EE,  is 




  xpxCo 8
3, , where it should be oo CxC   and 08
3
 xp . That is, if 
the down-stream compensates to the integrated up-stream within pxCo 8
32  , both 
streams will take the cooperative action and reach to the set of the cooperative action 
 EE,  that is Pareto optimal. 
 
In addition, it analyzes the next case where the penalty y is imposed on the 
integrated up-stream engaging in the opportunity cost without implementing the water 
management. In this case, the penalty is imposed on the integrated up-streams within 
yCC oo  , namely, oCy 2 , the both streams could take the cooperative action whereby 
achieve the set of efficient action  EE,  and it is Pareto optimal as shown in Fig.-24.  
 
Finally, here remarks that the above discussed only the extreme cases of 0 in 
Scenario 1 and 1  in Scenario 2, but the equilibrium of dU  varies with a random 
value of   in 10    as shown in Fig.-21. 
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6.  Conclusion 
 
  The paper analyzed on the possible cooperative action for an efficient water 
management among the streams in the irrigation system. In particular, the up and 
mid-streams often neglect the water management because of an easy access to water 
and possible engagement in the opportunity cost, as a result of which causes the 
negative effect on the water allocation to the down-stream. In this case, either of both 
streams prefers to be a free-rider if the other stream does the water management. Given 
that, it requires for both streams to take the cooperative action toward the efficient 
water management through the negotiation.  
 
Upon facilitating the analysis, it sets the 6 Cases for the different situations of water 
management in each stream for which analyzed the possible action toward the 
Fig.-22 : Payoff matrix by both equilibriums 
Fig.-23 : Nash equilibrium with compensation 
Fig.-24 : Nash equilibrium with penalty 
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cooperation by applying 2x2 Game Theory. For that, the different types of 2x2 Game 
Theory are adopted such as; Prisoner’s dilemma game, Chicken game, Battle of the sex 
game, Assurance game and Coordination game including Reference game designed for 
the analysis. As a result, it makes clear that the situations of water management under 
each type of 2x2 game except those in Reference game and Prisoner’s dilemma game 
could be improved toward the cooperative water management by both streams.    
 
On the other hand, the situation of water management applied by Prisoner’s dilemma 
game reflects the prevailing situation often observed in the up and mid-streams in 
many irrigation systems. Against this, it identified the necessity of incentives such as a 
compensation and penalty which should be imposed on the action taken by either of 
both streams in order to make a move toward the cooperative action, that is, to choose 
efficient water management action.     
 
Finally, the paper puts a special focus on the situation where exists the conflict 
around the water allocation among the streams due to the inefficient water 
management and raise the question on how to take the cooperative action against such 
situation. The result of analysis would propose the way of consideration for a solution 
toward better water use and management. 
 
 
 
[Notes] 
1)   The opportunity cost indicates that a farmer engage in other job besides farming practice at the   
period when he (or she)is required to do the water management in the stream.  
2)   UPRIIS was constructed in 1980’s with the investment by the World Bank. It is the largest     
irrigation system in Philippines which has been operated and managed by National Irrigation 
Administration (NIA).  
3)   Here replaces the up-stream and the mid-stream for the up and mid-streams in order to make   
clear the relation between the up and mid streams and the down-stream where the former is 
easy to access to the water while the water allocation in the latter depends on the water 
management by the former. 
4) Usually, the up-stream could firstly access to available irrigation water, followed by the 
mid-stream and the down-stream in the irrigation system in which there is a time lag.     
5) This means that it captures the issue of water management as one between the up and 
mid-streams and the down-stream. That is, whether the up and mid-streams would implement 
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6.  Conclusion 
 
  The paper analyzed on the possible cooperative action for an efficient water 
management among the streams in the irrigation system. In particular, the up and 
mid-streams often neglect the water management because of an easy access to water 
and possible engagement in the opportunity cost, as a result of which causes the 
negative effect on the water allocation to the down-stream. In this case, either of both 
streams prefers to be a free-rider if the other stream does the water management. Given 
that, it requires for both streams to take the cooperative action toward the efficient 
water management through the negotiation.  
 
Upon facilitating the analysis, it sets the 6 Cases for the different situations of water 
management in each stream for which analyzed the possible action toward the 
Fig.-22 : Payoff matrix by both equilibriums 
Fig.-23 : Nash equilibrium with compensation 
Fig.-24 : Nash equilibrium with penalty 
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the water management or not gives an effect to the water allocation for the down-stream. 
6) In fact, there exists the water user’s association in many irrigation systems in Asian countries 
which tackle with the water management together with farmers.  
7) It is noted that there are tree equilibrium solutions of  EE, 、  IEE,  and  EIE, . 
8) Needless to say, this is because the equilibrium solution  EE, is optimal than  IEIE, .  
9) This means that it is a close to the situation where IE weakly dominates E  in the payoff 
allocation. 
10) This approach is referred to Namatame (2001), pp.30-33 
11) It includes the point on the line. 
12) The “discounted average payoff” could be referred to Osborne (2009), pp.433-437 
13) The detail of the nonmyopic equilibria could be referred to Brams,1990, pp.120-127. 
14) Here captures the up and mid-streams as the one (or integrated) steam. This is the same as 
discussed in the Case 3. Therefore, it discusses the water management issue between two 
streams, namely the up and mid-streams and the down-stream.  
15) It does not take into account a capital input because irrigation facilities already exist and 
available water is a vested right for the basin. 
16) In this case, the sets of equilibrium solution are payoffs for  EE,  and  EIE, , respectively. 
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効率的な水配分に向けた交渉と協調行動
─２x２ゲーム理論の適用による分析─
吉　永　健　治
　本稿では、灌漑システムにおける流域間の効率的な水管理に向けた協調行動の可能性に関
して分析を行った。特に、上・中流域は水へのアクセスの容易さや機会費用の選択の可能性
から水管理を怠りがちになり下流域への水配分にネガティブな影響を与えることになる。こ
の場合、いずれかの流域が水管理を実施するならば、他の流域はタダ乗りを選好する。こう
したことから、両流域が交渉を通じて効率的な水管理へ向けた協調行動が求められる。
　分析に当たっては、２x ２ゲーム理論を適用して協調に向けた可能な行動を分析すること
を目的に、各流域における異なる水管理状況について６つのケースを設定した。２x ２ゲー
ム理論として、囚人のジレンマ・ゲーム、チキン・ゲーム、男女の戦い・ゲーム、保証・
ゲームおよび調整・ゲームを適用し、また分析の基準とするため参照・ゲームを設定した。
結果として、囚人のジレンマ・ゲームおよび参照・ゲーム以外のゲーム的状況にある水管理
状況は両流域による協調行動の達成が可能であることを明らかにした。一方、囚人のジレン
マ・ゲーム的状況にある水管理状況は多くの灌漑システムにおける上・中流域および下流域
間で一般的に観察される。しかし、こうした状況において効率的な水管理へ向けた協調行動
に移行するためには、両流域のいずれかに補償あるいは罰則といったインセンティブを課す
ことが必要であることを明らかにした。
　最後に、本稿は非効率的な水管理による流域間の水配分を巡る紛争が存在する状況に焦点
を当て、そうした状況に対していかにして協調的な行動がとられるかという課題について論
じた。分析の結果は好ましい水利用と水管理についての考え方を提供する。
キーワード： 水管理、水配分、２x ２ゲーム理論、紛争と協調行動、灌漑システム、上・中
流域と下流域、インセンティブ、補償と罰則
